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Privacy-Preserving Distributed Graph Filtering
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Abstract—With an increasingly interconnected and digitized
world, distributed signal processing and graph signal processing
have been proposed to process its big amount of data. However,
privacy has become one of the biggest challenges holding back
the widespread adoption of these tools for processing sensitive
data. As a step towards a solution, we demonstrate the privacy-
preserving capabilities of variants of the so-called distributed
graph filters. Such implementations allow each node to compute
a desired linear transformation of the networked data while
protecting its own private data. In particular, the proposed
approach eliminates the risk of possible privacy abuse by
ensuring that the private data is only available to its owner.
Moreover, it preserves the distributed implementation and keeps
the same communication and computational cost as its non-secure
counterparts. Furthermore, we show that this computational
model is secure under both passive and eavesdropping adversary
models. Finally, its performance is demonstrated by numerical
tests and it is shown to be a valid and competitive privacy-
preserving alternative to traditional distributed optimization
techniques.
Index Terms—distributed computation, distributed graph fil-
ters, encryption, graph signal processing, privacy-preserving
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern systems routinely gather large-scale data from dif-
ferent individuals and then draw inferences from these data. To
this end, graph signal processing (GSP) has been put forth and
proven effective for processing large amounts of networked
data by exploiting their inherent structural information [1].
However, to process these networked data in a distributed
manner, data exchange among different nodes is required.
As the underlying data usually contains sensitive information
about each individual node/agent in the network, the data
exchanges may raise privacy concerns for example: 1) insecure
communication channels which expose the data to eavesdrop-
pers; 2) the trust issues that appear when individuals agree
to participate in a distributed computation but are reluctant
to reveal their own data to others. In fact, as shown in [2],
the identities of individuals and their data are inseparable.
For example, with only an anonymous 10-ride bus ticket,
the identity of a specific bus passenger can be revealed [3].
Therefore, developing efficient techniques for processing large
volumes of data in a privacy-friendly manner is nowadays
required, posing new challenges that need to be overcome.
The insecure communication channel concern is usually
resolved by assuming securely encrypted channels [4]. The
trust issue, on the other hand, is particularly challenging as
inferences on the exchanged data are required and classical
channel encryption is insufficient. Existing privacy-preserving
algorithms for solving such trust issues can be broadly clas-
sified into two classes based on established security mod-
els: computational and information-theoretical. The first type
comprises computationally secure algorithms which ensure
privacy through the assumption of computational hardness;
that is, the malicious adversary is assumed to be compu-
tationally limited thus the secrets cannot be reconstructed
efficiently. These algorithms usually adopt popular techniques
like homomorphic encryption (HE) [5] and garbled circuit
(GC) [6] from secure multiparty computation (SMPC) [7]
to achieve privacy-preserving data aggregation [8], [9]. The
privacy of the nodes/agents is protected as all the data are
first encrypted and then the computations are conducted in
the encrypted domain. However, these techniques are usually
computationally demanding, and are thus hard to apply in
practice.
On the other hand, the information-theoretical security
model addresses the privacy issues through an information
theory point of view. Distinctly from the computational hard-
ness assumption, it assumes a computationally unlimited ad-
versary and that privacy is achieved only if the information
obtained by the adversary just leads to a slightly better (or
the same) posterior guess of the private data compared to
the prior. Information-theoretical security is usually achieved
by obfuscating the private data through noise insertion, it is
thus computationally lightweight and has been used in various
fields through different noise insertion methods, e.g., zero-
sum noise insertion for distributed average consensus [10]–
[12]; differentially private Kalman filtering [13]; secret sharing
based recursive least squares [14]; subspace noise insertion
using distributed optimization [15], [16]. However, these al-
gorithms suffer from a heavy communication overhead as a
large number of iterations is required for convergence.
As a first step towards providing both computational and
communication efficient privacy-preserving networked data
processing, in this paper, we focus on addressing the privacy
issues in the context of distributed graph filtering, the building
block of GSP. As the conventional distributed graph filtering
contains mainly two parts: offline learning conducted by a
trusted third party (TTP) and online distributed computation by
network nodes, we, therefore, propose a complete framework
to avoid possible privacy abuse in both the offline and online
steps. In the offline step, the TTP receives only the encryption
seeds from the nodes and not their private data; while in
the online step, an information-theoretical security model is
achieved through noise insertion, which protects the private
data of each node from being revealed to others in the network.
II. DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING OVER NETWORKS
Consider an N -dimensional signal x residing on a graph
G = {V, E}, where N = {1, . . . , N} denotes the set of N
nodes and E ⊆ N ×N denotes the set of M edges. Further,
let Ni = {j|(i, j) ∈ E} denote the neighbourhood of the i-th
node. The goal of distributed processing over networks is to
compute a transformation, H, of the networked data, x, i.e.,
y = H(x), (1)
in a distributed manner; that is, only employing local data
exchanges, i.e., data exchanges among neighboring nodes.
Although H can take many forms, e.g., optimization prob-
lems [17], linear or non-linear transforms [18], here, we focus
on transformations that are linear, or that can be properly
approximated by a linear transformation, i.e.,
y = Hx (2)
such as the consensus operation, i.e., H = 11> , which are
pervasive in typical network processing tasks, e.g., denois-
ing [19], interpolation [20]. A popular way to implement (or
approximate) H is to express it as a K-th order polynomial
of a matrix representation of G, i.e.,
Hc ,
K∑
k=0
φkS
k, (3)
where {φk ∈ R}Kk=0 are the filter coefficients; and S is the
so-called graph shift operator in GSP [1]. Common choices
of S are the weighted graph adjacency matrix W and the
graph Laplacian matrix L. By construction, S is an N ×N -
symmetric matrix for undirected graphs and carries the notion
of frequency in the graph setting through its eigen decomposi-
tion [1], [21]. The matrix polynomial in (3) is typically referred
to as a classical (node-invariant) FIR graph filters. Note that by
making use of the local structure of S, the computation of (3)
can be implemented in a distributed way [22], [23], where each
node can locally compute the k-th shift of x by exchanging
its previous shifted versions within its neighbourhood, i.e.,
Skx = S(Sk−1x). This distributed implementation is par-
ticularly beneficial in saving the communication overhead and
computational complexity because a FIR graph filter of order
K incurs in a cost of O(MK).
Though the computational and communication cost scales
linearly with K, a large K is usually required to obtain a high
approximation accuracy. To alleviate this issue, the constrained
edge-variant (CEV) FIR graph filters [24] were proposed to
approximate the desired graph filter with a lower order K by
endowing it with more degrees of freedom, i.e.,
Hcev ,
K∑
k=0
ΦkS
k, (4)
where the coefficient matrices {Φk ∈ RN×N}Kk=0 denote
the weights that each node assigns to its edges at shift k,
and they share the support with S + IN , where IN is the
N × N -identity matrix. It is easy to see that (4) reduces to
the classical FIR graph filter if Φk = φkIN . And it also
reduces to the node-variant FIR graph filter [23] if {Φk}Kk=0
are diagonal matrices. Note that while the CEV FIR filters (4)
still enjoy a distributed implementation and the communication
and computational cost remains O(MK), they allow for a
richer family of linear operators that can be approximated as
they are not restricted to linear operators that commute with
the graph shift operator.
III. PRIVACY-PRESERVING PROCESSING
In this section, we first highlight the privacy concerns of
distributed data processing using current FIR graph filters and
introduce the adversary models. The latter is an important
issue when designing privacy-preserving protocols. We then
formally state the problem addressed in this work.
A. Privacy concern
Generally, privacy is associated with individuals and their
personal data. Thus, we identify the privacy concern in graph
filtering is to protect the input graph signal xi of each node
from being revealed. This is motivated by the fact that this
data usually contains sensitive information about the individual
like health condition or political views. Unfortunately, this
privacy concern is not addressed in current distributed FIR
graph filters, since the private data xi is propagated through
the network and exposed to neighbors and eavesdroppers.
B. Adversary model
To evaluate the robustness of a system under different
security attacks, we consider the so-call adversary model. An
adversary can be both external or internal to the network, and
aims to conduct certain malicious activities such as inferring
the private data by controlling a number of nodes. These con-
trolled nodes are referred to as corrupted nodes and the others
are called non-corrupted or honest nodes. In this paper we
will address two widely-used adversary models: eavesdropping
and passive. The eavesdropping adversary attempts to infer the
private data by eavesdropping the communication channels in
the network. The passive adversary, on the other hand, assumes
that all the nodes follow the protocol instructions and aims
also to infer the private data of honest nodes through the
information collected by all the corrupted nodes.
C. Problem formulation
Putting things together, we conclude that a privacy-
preserving distributed graph filter should be able to protect
private data while computing the filter output. To this end, we
formulate the problem as follows; given a linear transform H ,
design an encryption function E(x) and related operator He
that satisfy the following two requirements simultaneously:
• Output correctness: all nodes should be able to achieve
the correct filtering output, i.e.,
y = Hx = Hexe, (5)
where xe = E(x) denotes the encrypted input data.
• Individual privacy: after encryption, each node uses the
encrypted data xei as its input. In addition, the information
theoretic security criterion
I(Xi;X
e
i ) < εi,∀i ∈ N , (6)
must be met. Here, I(·) denotes mutual information [25];
xei and xi are assumed to be a realization of random
variables Xei and Xi, respectively, and εi is the desired
privacy level of node i. Hence, (6) guarantees that the
encrypted xei reveals asymptotically no information about
the private data xi,
IV. PROPOSED APPROACH
Before moving to our proposed method, let us first consider
the following straightforward design for both E(x) and He.
The privacy of each node can be preserved by considering the
following rendition of the edge-variant graph filter [c.f. (4)],
i.e.,
Hrev =
K∑
k=0
SkΦk. (7)
Here, each node exploits the graph filter coefficients as en-
cryption seeds to mask its private data and sends the masked
data to its neighbours. Note that (4) and (7) are equivalent
when ΦkS = SΦk ∀k and that the graph filter (7) can also
be implemented distributively. However, there is a price to
pay: instead of having a communication cost O(KM), the
implementation now has an overall communication cost of
O(K2M). Unfortunately, for this case, although the above-
mentioned requirements can be achieved, there seems to be no
free lunch and communication complexity has to be sacrificed.
To alleviate the communication overhead, we now proceed
to introduce another choice for both E(x) and He meeting
the above-mentioned requirements. We further analyze their
performance in two widely-used adversary models.
A. Encryption function design
One typical way to maintain privacy is to obfuscate the
private data by inserting noise since it is computationally
lightweight. We, therefore, propose to design the encryption
function using multiplicative noises as
E(x) = diag(e)x, (8)
where e = [e1, . . . , eN ]
T ∈ RN is the encryption vector. Thus
the encrypted data of node i is given by xei = eixi. Let ei
denote a realization of random variable Ei having differential
entropy h(Ei), assuming it exists1. The concerned individual
privacy for node i is thus I(Xi;XiEi) = h(Xi)−h(Xi|XiEi).
To guarantee privacy, we need the following result.
Proposition 1. Consider X and Y as independent continuous
random variables with mean µ(X), µ(Y ) < ∞ and variance
0 < var(X) < var(Y ) <∞, and let Z = XY . Then
lim
var(Y)→∞
I(X;Z) = 0,
assuming I(X;Z) exists.
Proof. As X is independent with Y , we have var(Z) =
var(X)var(Y ) + var(X)µ2(Y ) + var(Y )µ2(X). Let γ =
1If Ei is a discrete random variable, the conditions are given in terms of
the Shannon entropy H(Ei).
1/(var(Z))
1
2 and define Z ′ = γZ. Hence, Z ′ has unit vari-
ance. We have I(X;Z) = I(γX;Z ′) as mutual information
is scale-invariant. Thus,
lim
var(Y)→∞
I(X;Z) = lim
γ→0
I(γX;Z ′) = I(0;Z ′) = 0.

So, applying Proposition 1 to the problem at hand, we have
lim
var(Ei)→∞
I(Xi;XiEi) = 0. (9)
We conclude that each node is able to achieve arbitrary small
information loss by increasing the variance of its encryption
seed. Hence, the privacy requirement in (6) is satisfied.
B. Encrypted operator design
To fullfil the output correctness requirement, we should
design the encrypted operator He satisfying He =
H diag(e)−1. To this end, we then further approximate the
desired encrypted operator He using standard distributed
graph filters. Here, we use the constrained edge-variant graph
filter as an example, which in turn leads to the following
convex optimization problem
min
{Φk}
∥∥∥∥∥He −
(
K∑
k=0
ΦkS
k
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
F
s.t. supp {Φk} = supp{S + IN} ∀k ∈ [K], (10)
where ‖·‖F is Frobenius norm and supp{·} denotes the sup-
port of its argument. To solve the above-mentioned problem,
we assume a TTP (cloud/server) to learn the filter coefficients
offline. In order to avoid possible data abuse, we have the
following assumptions which minimize the amount of infor-
mation available to each node while still guaranteeing the
distributed implementation, i.e.,
Assumption 1. (Knowledge of the TTP) The TTP has the
knowledge of the desired data transformation H , the en-
cryption seeds e, the graph shift operator S and the filter
coefficients {Φk}Kk=0.
Assumption 2. (Knowledge of the nodes) Each node i
only has knowledge of its private data xi, and its cor-
responding entries of both S and filter coefficients, i.e.,
[S]i,j∈Ni∪{i}, {[Φk]i,j∈Ni∪{i}}Kk=0.
Note that Assumptions 2 is motivated similarly as the
distributed signal processing [17], [26] that each node only has
local knowledge of its neighbourhood. That is, each node does
not have the knowledge of the desired data transformation H .
For example, for the distributed average consensus application,
i.e., H = 1N 11
T , all the nodes would like to reach an
agreement over the network but they do not know the size of
the network, i.e., N . In the distributed recursive least squares
application [14], each node only has its local observations but
not the full knowledge of the whole system. After the offline
learning, the filter output can be computed distributedly. It is
worth to note that the communication and computational cost
remains O(KM). The proposed approach is summarized in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Privacy-preserving distributed FIR graph filters
1: Offine learning (secure channels)
2: Each node i ∈ N chooses its encryption seed ei based on
its desired privacy level εi, and sends it to the TTP.
3: The TTP first computes He = H diag(e)−1 and solves
the problem (10), and then sends the corresponding infor-
mation [S]i,j∈Ni∪{i}, {[Φk]i,j∈Ni∪{i}}Kk=0 to node i.
4: Online distributed computation (non-secure channels)
5: Each node i initializes x(0)i = x
e
i .
6: while k = 0, . . . ,K do
7: Collect x(k)j from all neighbours j ∈ Ni
8: Store locally z(k)i =
∑
j∈Ni∪{i}[Φk]ijx
(k)
j
9: Compute x(k+1)i =
∑
j∈Ni∪{i}[S]ijx
(k)
j
10: Send x(k+1)i to all neighbours j ∈ Ni
11: end while
12: Set yi =
∑K
k=0 z
(k)
i
C. Privacy analysis under adversary models
We now analyze the individual privacy concern under both
an eavesdropping and a passive adversary. For an eavesdrop-
ping adversary, we assume that the communication required
in offline learning is conducted through secure channels.
That is, the channels should be securely encrypted [4] when
transmitting the encryption seeds to the TTP and receiving
the associated filter coefficients and graph shift operator. As a
consequence, the secure channel encryption cost is 2N . The
online distributed computation step, as it is an iterative process,
we remark that ∀k > 0 : Xi → X(0) → X(k) forms a Markov
chain where vector X(k) = [X(k)1 , . . . , X
(k)
N ]
> denotes all
random variables over the network at iteration k. By the data
processing inequality [25] we have
I(Xi;X
(0)) ≥ I(Xi;X(k)), ∀k > 0, (11)
which implies that all the information transmitted in the online
step will not reveal additional information. As a consequence,
the online step is secure against eavesdropping adversaries
without requiring secure channel encryption at all. For the
case of a passive adversary, recall Assumptions 1-2, we can
see that the corrupted nodes cannot reconstruct the encryption
seeds e as H is only known to the TTP. We then conclude
that the private data of an honest node is guaranteed even if all
other nodes are corrupted (assuming the TTP is not corrupted).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We now proceed to present the performance of the pro-
posed approach for approximating user-provided frequency
responses and compare it with the distributed optimization
technique. We randomly generate a community graph using
the GSP toolbox [27] with N = 40 nodes and choose the
normalized Laplacian as the graph shift operator S. Here,
we consider as maximum filter order K = 15. To show the
performance of approximating different frequency responses,
we consider two cases commonly used in the GSP community:
Fig. 1. Approximation error comparison between the p-CEV and the n-CEV
graph filter for different orders. (Top) Results for the exponential kernel.
(Bottom) Results for an ideal low-pass filter
1) the exponential kernel
h(λ) := e−γ(λ−µ)
2
,
where γ denotes the spectrum decaying factor and µ is
the central parameter;
2) the ideal low pass filter
h(λ) =
{
1 0 ≤ λ ≤ λc
0 otherwise ,
where λc denotes the cutoff frequency.
In Fig. 1, we demonstrate the normalized approximation
error in terms of Frobenius norm between the desired, H , and
the fitted, Hfit , frequency response, i.e., ‖H−Hfit‖2F /‖H‖2F ,
of the proposed privacy-preserving CEV (p-CEV) filter with
the non-private CEV (n-CEV) filter for both scenarios. As we
can see, both filters saturate at an order of K = 7 but the
proposed p-CEV has a higher error floor for the case of the
exponential kernel. And the proposed p-CEV requires a few
orders more to achieve the same error floor as the n-CEV for
approximating the ideal low pass filter. Overall, we conclude
that the proposed approach is able to approximate the desired
frequency responses and keeps its private data protected.
In Fig. 2, we compare the normalized error as a function of
iteration number between desired filter output y = Hx and
the approximated one yfit = Hfitx of the proposed p-CEV
graph filter and the privacy-preserving alternative using dis-
tributed optimization in the average consensus application. In
particular, we choose to compare with the privacy-preserving
primal-dual method of multipliers (p-PDMM) proposed in [15]
as it also achieves information-theoretical security by noise
insertion. In both algorithms, we set the noise variance as
100 times the variance of the associated private data, thereby
guaranteeing a similar amount of noise perturbation. As we
can see, the noise insertion will lead to a high initial error
for p-PDMM therefore requiring more iterations to converge.
To provide insights into the question on what is the difference
between GSP and distributed optimization from the privacy-
preserving perspective, we compare these two approaches in
terms of several important parameters in Table I:
1) Both approaches obtain the information-theoretical se-
curity model and consider the same adversary models:
passive and eavesdropping.
100 101 102
10−3
100
102
105
Iteration
‖y
fi
t
−
y
‖2 2
/‖
y
‖2 2
p-CEV FIR
p-PDMM
Fig. 2. Normalized output error versus the number of iterations of the
proposed p-CEV filter and the p-PDMM for the average consensus problem
2) Perfect approximation is not possible and thus the pro-
posed approach is not as accurate as the p-PDMM, while
the price to pay for the accuracy is the communication
cost. The iteration number T of the p-PDMM is usu-
ally far larger than the filter order K of the proposed
approach, i.e., T  K.
3) Both approaches require secure channels in the ini-
tialization step to guarantee the inserted noise cannot
be eavesdropped, but the complexity of the proposed
approach is usually lower, i.e., M > N .
4) The proposed approach assumes that the trusted third
party is not corrupted to guarantee the privacy of each
node while the p-PDMM requires each honest node has
one honest neighbour.
We conclude that the proposed approach is beneficial in
solving distributed signal processing tasks in terms of both
communication and computational cost. More specifically, the
proposed approach is preferred if the required accuracy is not
very strict, while the p-PDMM is more attractive if the system
requires strictly accurate solution, but with a price of a higher
communication cost.
TABLE I
COMPARISON WITH DISTRIBUTED OPTIMIZATION
Proposed p-PDMM [15]
Security model Information-theoretic Information-theoretic
Adversary model Passive/Eavesdropping Passive/Eavesdropping
Accuracy Approximate Accurate
Communication complexity O(MK) O(MT )
Secure channels O(N) O(M)
Honest neighbour No Yes
Trusted Third Party Yes No
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a communication and com-
putationally efficient solution to achieve privacy-preserving
distributed graph filters which allow each node to compute
its desired output and protect its own private data simulta-
neously. To protect the privacy, each node first inserts noise
to obfuscate its private data and sends the obfuscated data
to its neighborhood. Numerical tests demonstrated that the
proposed approach is able to approximate some desired graph
frequency responses with a small filter order and that it is
a competitive alternative compared to the privacy-preserving
distributed optimization approach in the distributed average
consensus problem.
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